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Abstract 
This paper investigates empirically whether the natural resource curse exists and if 
institutions can help alleviate this curse. Both cross-country and dynamic panel regressions 
confirm the important role of institutional quality (measured by either institutional design or 
institutional performance) in turning natural resources into an economic boon. In terms of 
influencing the impact of natural resource abundance on growth, a democratic governance 
system is better than a non-democratic one, a parliamentary democracy is superior to a 
presidential democracy and, although a majoritarian system tends to contribute more to 
growth, it suffers more from the resource curse than a proportional system. 
Keywords: economic growth, natural resources, institution design, institution performance, 
world, resource rich countries. 
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1- Introduction 
Prior to the twentieth century, natural resources, usually comprising primary 
commodities, played a pivotal role in world trade. Many countries, such as Australia, the 
United States, and Canada, benefited greatly from significant primary commodity exports in 
the early stages of their economic development (North and Thomas, 1973; Auty and Mikesell, 
1998). However, since the turn to the twentieth century, natural resources have often been 
treated as less important than labour and capital in generating economic growth and 3 
 
 
development. In fact, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that natural resource 
abundance may be harmful to the economic development of low and middle income 
countries. This counter-intuitive result underpins the so-called resource curse puzzle 
(Nankani, 1979; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001).  
Several conjectures have been offered towards explaining the natural resource curse 
puzzle. The Dutch disease theory postulates that natural resource abundance leads to a decline 
in the production and export of the manufacturing sector which possibly leads to de-
industrialisation and lower economic growth. The reason for this is that the export of natural 
resources generates a substantial inflow of foreign capital which in turn causes an 
appreciation of the domestic currency and a decline in domestic competitiveness. The 
damaging consequences are even higher if resource proceeds are mainly used for 
consumption instead of investment (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Sachs, 2007). The rent 
seeking synthesis, e.g. Torvik (2002), suggests that highly resource abundant countries have a 
higher incidence of firms engaging in rent seeking activities, leaving only a few to engage in 
productive ventures. Such rent seeking activities tend to be more popular among firms 
working in countries that have low quality institutions since, as explained by Lane and Tornell 
(1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), and Mehlum et al. (2006a), low quality institutions are less 
likely to draw entrepreneurs into productive activity than are good institutions. In other words, 
having good institutions will cure the resource curse. 
Most studies that attempt to empirically validate/refute the resource curse hypothesis 
are derived from the seminal works by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). These studies 
typically assume the existence of an unconditional resource curse – resource abundance is 
correlated with measures of economic development without accounting for other economic, 
social and institutional factors that may affect this relationship. This approach is clearly not 
adequate since it does not explain why countries like Botswana, which is rich in diamonds, is 4 
 
 
not resource cursed while Sierra Leone, also abundant in diamonds, does seem to be cursed. 
Similar comparisons can also be made between, for example Norway and Nigeria, the two oil 
endowed countries. Thanks to the proper utilisation of the oil discovery, Norway has 
transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in Europe during the early 1900s into the 
country of highest quality of life today (UNDP, 2009). On the other hand, Nigeria is notorious 
for its mismanagement of resource proceeds as well as general corrupt tendencies, hence little 
economic growth (e.g. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). 
In view of the fact that earlier studies fail to account for such divergent growth 
experiences, despite similar resource type and abundance, more plausible explanations have 
recently been proposed in the literature (e.g. Mehlum et al. , 2006b; Arezki and van der Ploeg, 
2007; Boschini et al., 2007; Humphreys et al., 2007). These studies have identified 
institutional quality as the main conduit through which natural resource abundance affects 
economic growth. Specifically, natural resource abundant economies have the potential to 
escape the resource curse provided they have good institutions. Therefore, the conclusion 
arising from these studies is “to abandon the stylised fact that natural resource abundance is 
bad for growth” (Lederman and Maloney, 2007, p. 33) and, instead, to understand under what 
circumstances the resource curse does or does not hold.  
Unfortunately, whilst this more recent literature provides a richer analysis and 
promises to be more relevant to policy makers, arguments can be made that it is still deficient 
in several directions. One deficiency relates to the estimation methods used in the typical 
empirical analysis. Evidence provided using cross-country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
approaches to examining the existence of the unconditional resource curse does not survive 
the use of panel instrumental variable estimation techniques. For instance, Lederman and 
Maloney (2002, 2007) allowed for endogeneity among explanatory variables, by using a 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator in an attempt to add more 5 
 
 
precision to the estimates and found no evidence of Sachs and Warner’s (1995; 1997) 
resource curse.
1 Manzano and Rigobon (2001, 2007) also confirmed that Sachs and Warner’s 
results were not robust after using a fixed-effects panel estimation technique. The differences 
in the results might be expected because cross-country OLS estimation fails to take into 
consideration endogeneity, heterogeneity and omitted variables biases - problems that are 
prevalent in empirical growth models but that an instrumental panel estimator is capable of 
alleviating (Islam, 1995; Hoeffler, 2001). Notwithstanding, the latest literature examining the 
conditionality (on institutional quality) of the resource curse tends to use the same cross-
country OLS empirical methodology that predicted incorrectly that all resource abundant 
economies are destined to be cursed. An empirical examination of the conditional resource 
curse hypothesis using such a panel (instrumental) estimator is clearly merited.  
A second deficiency concerns the natural resource abundance indicator used in the 
more recent literature. The problem arises from the perpetual use of Sachs and Warner’s 
(1995; 1997) resource indicator (e.g. Manzano and Rigobon, 2007; Mehlum et al., 2006b), 
which is the share of primary exports (sum of exports of primary agriculture, fuels and metals, 
energy) in GDP or exports. This indicator is problematic in the sense that it merely captures 
the lack of non-resource sectors, rather than indicating whether a country is resource-based or 
not. For instance, using the indicator for countries such as Norway and Australia that have a 
high resource abundance per capita, but also have a relatively large non-resource sector will 
incorrectly suggest that they are resource poor (as reflected by relatively small shares of 
primary exports). If anything, the dominance of primary exports is an indication of how 
specialised a country is, and this may be related to the structure of the economy rather than to 
the resource curse. 
The goal of this paper is to address the above mentioned deficiencies in the current 
literature. In particular, it tests the hypothesis that the effect of resources on growth is 6 
 
 
conditional on the type and quality of institutions using a sample of 53 countries over the 
period of 20 years (1984-2003). This is done by further building on Boschini et al.’s (2007) 
and Mehlum et al.’s (2006) influential works on the role of institutions in abating the resource 
curse. Advances are made in the following directions: (i) using a panel for a large number of 
countries with different levels of development, institutional quality, and natural resource 
abundance over an extended period of time; (ii) applying a two-step system GMM estimation 
that eliminate biases associated with omitted variables, endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity that potentially affect cross-sectional OLS growth results in the current 
literature; (iii) supplementing results of the commonly used International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) institutional performance indicators with those of institutional design indicators; and 
(iv) using a resource abundance indicator that focuses on non-renewable resources rather than 
the share of primary exports.  
From an econometric point of view, by utilising a panel estimation technique the 
current paper is related to work by Bravo-Ortega and de Gregio (2007) and Collier and 
Goderis (2007). The first one uses random and fixed effects estimators to explain the 
conditionality on human capital of the resource curse, while the second one uses a panel 
cointegration technique to explain the conditionality on institutional quality (and investment 
levels) of the resource curse. The current paper uses instead a panel two-step system GMM 
estimator. In so doing, the paper is more closely related to the work of Lederman and 
Maloney (2007). However, the latter research assumes an unconditional resource curse.  
Finally, the analysis in the paper considers institutional design as well as institutional 
performance, in order to examine the sensitivity of the conditionality of the resource curse 
evidence to the use of different, non-standard institutional measures. In doing so, the paper 
supplements the only study as far as the resource curse is concerned by Andersen and 
Aslaksen (2008), that considers the role of this institutional quality measure. Whilst the 7 
 
 
research in this paper and their study are similar in terms of using institutional design instead 
of institutional performance, they clearly differ in their econometric approach and resource 
abundance measures. Whilst Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) uses a single cross country 
regression along with Sachs and Warner’s (1995,1997) indicator, the current paper uses a 
panel setting and an exclusively non-renewable resource indicator.  
The key hypothesis that natural resource economies are not destined to be cursed if 
they have good institutions is confirmed by the empirical results of this paper. Specifically, 
the results suggest that (a) adopting a democratic regime is better than a non-democratic one, 
in terms of generating growth from resource abundance; (b) the electoral rules that a country 
adopts matter: having a democratic majority rather than a democratic proportional regime 
increases the growth benefits of resource abundance; and (c) as far as the form of government 
adopted is concerned, a democratic parliamentary regime rather than a democratic presidential 
regime is found to be more growth enhancing in the presence of abundant natural resources. 
Therefore, the lessons for policy makers who struggle to overcome the impediments to 
economic development that potentially accompany the ‘curse of resource abundance’ are a 
need to develop and maintain better institutions and to adopt improved management strategies 
of the financial proceeds coming from such abundance. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents the cross-sectional 
evidence on natural resources and institutions. Section 3 presents the results of the dynamic 
regressions. Section 4 compares results when different measures of institutions are used. 
Section 5 ends the paper with some concluding remarks. Detailed variable description, data 
source, and a list of countries in the sample can be found in the Appendices. 8 
 
 
2- Resource curse and institutions in a cross-section of countries 
The first step this paper takes is to examine the relationship between the resource curse and 
institutions in a context of a cross-section of countries. The framework is similar to those of  
Mehlum et al. (2006b) and Boschini et al. (2007) which are based on the earlier work by Sala-
i-Martin (1997). The underlying hypothesis is that the resource curse does exist, but that 
having a good institutional setting will help to abate this curse. The general regression 
equation is: 
   (1) 
where   is the growth rate over year 0 and T,  , iT Y  is real per capita GDP for 
country i at year T ,  ,0 i Y  is the real GDP per capita at the beginning of the period,  , iT NR  is an 
indicator capturing natural resource abundance,  , iT INSTQ  is the quality level of institutions, 
,, * iT iT NR INSTQ  is an interaction term between natural resources and institutions, and  , iT X  is 
the set of other control variables including trade openness, investment, and regional dummies.  
In this study, a growth framework is chosen over a levels framework in order to 
capture the conditional convergence effect (through the log of initial income) which is often 
found in empirical growth models, e.g. Mankiw et al. (1992).
2 In addition, using equation (1), 
it can be shown that the levels regression is nested within the growth regression. From this 
framework, the partial impact of an increase in natural resource abundance on growth can be 
derived as follows: 
 
To simplify the notation, the country and time indices are removed. The resource curse 
hypothesis implies that  2 0 β <  while the view that good institutions help alleviate the resource 9 
 
 
curse  implies that  4 0 β > . In addition, the resource curse will be completely eliminated 
(i.e. 24 0 INSTQ β β +≥ ) when institutional quality is greater than the required threshold which 
is equal to  24 / β β − . 
To compute the measure of natural resource abundance, this paper employs data on 
per capita resource intensity, provided by the World Bank, which comprise of mineral, 
forestry, and energy resources. To focus specifically on non-renewable resources, forestry 
rents are excluded. The constructed indicator, which is identical to the one used in Rambaldi 
et al. (2005) and Stijns (2006), is a more appropriate measure than others for two main 
reasons. First, it captures the fact that the resource curse is mostly concerned with non-
renewable resources: non-renewable resources may be exhausted if extraction is too excessive 
whereas this issue of sustainability does not arise with renewable resources. Second, it helps 
overcome the ‘circularity and bias’ problems arising from regressing real GDP per capita 
growth on the ratio of resource rents to GDP, which is commonly used as a proxy for natural 
resource abundance in the literature. As pointed out by Rambaldi et al. (2005), it is very likely 
that natural resource abundance is affected by historic transformation in economic growth 
since GDP appears in both the dependent variable and the denominator of the explanatory 
variable. Ideally, an indicator that measures stock rather than flow of natural resources should 
be used because a stock measure reveals the amount of resource wealth a country possesses 
while a flow variable is a measure of income generated from the resource endowment for a 
particular year. However, the unavailability of data prevents this paper from using such a 
stock measure. 
To measure institutional quality, this paper uses an indicator constructed based on 
Knack’s (2000) method. The raw data used for this calculation come from the ICRG survey. 
The constructed indicator is an unweighted average of quality of law and order, corruption, 
and bureaucratic and it ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the index, the better are the institutions. 10 
 
 
This paper recognises several other available measures of institutional quality in the literature, 
for example, the governance composite index by Kaufmann et al. (2007). Another example is 
the aggregate index of economic freedom of the Fraser Institute (Gwarteny and Lawson, 
2008). However, these data sets have a very limited time-series dimension which can hardly 
be used for panel estimation.
3 As a result, this paper opts for the above mentioned constructed 
index for its wide range of coverage, long time-series dimension, and broad scope of 
definition.  
As for other variables, this paper measures the real GDP per capita in US dollars (at 
2000 constant price level). Trade openness is measured by total trade as a share of GDP. 
Investment is proxied by the gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. All these data 
are collected from the World Development Indicators database. The two dummy variables 
representing countries in Latin America and Africa are denote as ‘Latin’ and ‘Africa’ 
respectively. 
Table 1 provides results estimated by simple OLS regressions for a cross-section of countries 
in the period 1984-2003. In the first column, average growth of GDP per capita is regressed 
on the log of initial GDP per capital in 1984, the natural resource abundance indicator, the 
institutional quality, an interaction term of these two variables, the log of trade share, the log 
of investment share, and the two dummy variables characterising Latin American and African 
countries. In the next column, the dummy variables are excluded. In the third column, the 
regression is run on a subset of the original sample – those African countries are excluded. 
This is done to test if the resource curse is mainly an ‘African phenomenon’ as pointed out by 
Mehlum  et al. (2006) and Boschini et al. (2007). In the last two columns, the variable 
measuring trade openness is excluded.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 11 
 
 
It can be seen that the coefficient on the initial income term is always negative and 
highly significant which confirms the convergence predictions of Neo-classical growth 
theory. The expected positive and significant impact of investment on growth is confirmed in 
this paper. However, trade openness does not have the expected sign. Its coefficient is always 
negative, though insignificant.  
Turning to the variables of interest, it is found that the results obtained are in line with 
those by Mehlum et al. (2006) and Boschini et al. (2007). The coefficient on natural resource 
abundance is negative and statistically significant while that on the interaction term is always 
positive and significant. Institutional quality has a positive and significant impact on growth 
as expected. These results are stable and robust across different specifications. Overall, the 
results indicate that countries with stronger institutions and lower level of natural resource 
abundance are likely to grow faster. In addition, higher level of institutional quality will 
alleviate the negative impact of natural resources on growth. The results are true for the whole 
sample indicating that the resource curse (and its institution cure) is not just an African (or 
Latin American) phenomenon.   
The partial growth impact of a marginal increase in resource abundance (holding all other 
variables constant) implied by regression (1.1), for instance, is: 
 
The regression results indicate that the institutional threshold for not having the 
resource curse is  24 () 0 . 5 β β −= . Above this threshold, the partial contribution of natural 
resource abundance on growth is higher for a high resource endowed country than a low 
endowed one, whereas the reverse holds below the institutional threshold. In short, countries 
with institutional quality above 0.5 are not going to be resource cursed. As indicated in the 
Appendix, Dominican Republic and other countries ranked above it all pass this threshold. 12 
 
 
However, as discussed extensively in the literature, there might be some potential 
problems associated with OLS regressions of this kind. The first concerns the fact that OLS 
cross-country analysis often ignores unobserved country-specific effects, which may result in 
omitted variable bias. The second is the issue of endogeneity and measurement error bias. For 
instance, it is difficult to capture resource abundance as a stock variable, forcing researchers 
to utilise a flow variable instead .The latter may just be measuring resource dependence rather 
than abundance. Therefore, measurement error might be present and the incorrect inferences 
may be drawn as a result. The third one is the potential endogeneity problem due to reverse 
causality between institutional quality and economic growth. This is called the ‘halo effect’ as 
per Dollar and Kraay (2003): countries may have good institutions because they are rich. To 
address these problems, this paper employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
procedure using instruments used previously in the literature. In particular, a latitude variable 
is used to instrument institutions and latitude interacted with resource abundance is used to 
instrument the interaction term. The use of latitude as an instrument for institutions is initiated 
by Hall and Jones (1999) who argue that the distance to the equator is related to ‘western 
influence’ which in turn leads to good institutions. The data on latitude are collected from 
Treisman (2007). 
An exogeneity test performed on institutions variable reveals that the endogeneity is 
not a significant problem. This implies that there is some confidence in the initial OLS results. 
However, this paper still carries out the 2SLS estimation to compare its results with the OLS 
results, bearing in mind that the 2SLS estimate is less efficient than the OLS when 
explanatory variables are exogenous. The results are reported in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The upper panel of Table 2 presents the results from re-running the regressions 
underlying the results presented in Table 1 but instead employing an instrumental variable 13 
 
 
(IV) technique. All regressions contain an unreported constant. The 2SLS results, in general, 
are similar to OLS estimation results of Error! Reference source not found., although the 
significance level is much higher. The only exception is that the magnitude of the coefficient 
on institutional quality is much larger in the 2SLS case. This is consistent with Boschini et 
al.’s (2007) results. All regressions confirm the importance of institutions and natural 
resources in explaining the cross-countries variation in growth performance.   
The first stage regressions in the lower panel offer some interesting results. It is shown 
that latitude is positively and significantly correlated with institutional quality. Additionally, 
the instrument for the interacted term is positively and highly correlated with the interacted 
term. In short, both the OLS and 2SLS cross sectional results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that countries with good institutions will not be resource cursed. 
3- Resource curse and institutions in a dynamic framework 
In the last section, cross-sectional regressions showed that very long-run growth is 
significantly and negatively affected by natural resource abundance but also that this negative 
effect is alleviated by high level of institutional quality. A disadvantage of those cross-
sectional regressions is that it is difficult to separate the pure effects of those variables from 
potential unobserved factors, such as geographic or climate conditions, that explain 
differences in growth rates across countries but vary very little over time. To overcome this 
limitation, a dynamic framework that relates the growth rates of real GDP per capita over time 
to changes in variables of interest will be used in this section. To begin, the following panel 




where   is a country fixed effect that does not vary over time,   is a period effect that is 
common across countries,   is the number of years lagged, and others are as previously 
defined. A three-year lag is used because we use three-year moving average growth rates as 
the dependent variable in order to mitigate short run business cycle effects.
4 The inclusion of 
the country fixed effects is expected to pick up omitted time invariant country characteristics 
like geographical factors, while the period specific effect will help pick up omitted shocks 
occurring in all countries similarly like the world business cycle effect.  
An estimation technique developed by Caselli et al. (1996) suggests the 
transformation of the level regression to regression in differences as follows: 
                                                                               (2) 
This regression equation can be estimated by a differenced GMM estimation method 
in which lagged levels are employed as instruments for the differences. However, as natural 
resource abundance and institutions show little variation with time, these levels can be weak 
instrument. As a result, this paper follows Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) in using a system GMM estimation method that includes the regression equation in 
levels and uses lagged differences of the endogenous variables as instruments. Using this 
technique and focusing on changes in GDP per capita over different 3-year periods, it is 
expected that more informative results about the partial effects of changes in natural resource 
abundance, and institutions on growth will be obtained. All results obtained are presented in 
Table 3. 
In Table 3, regression (3.1) includes all explanatory variables as well as regional 
dummies. Regression (3.2) is a more parsimonious presentation in the sense that it excludes 
the regional dummies. Regression (3.3) excludes African economies as well as regional 15 
 
 
dummies, while regression (3.4) excludes the trade openness variable as well as regional 
dummies. In all the regressions, even though not reported, time dummies and constants have 
been included.  
It can be seen that the coefficient on natural resource abundance is always negative 
and statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
institutional quality and natural resource is always significant and positive. Interestingly, the 
impact of the institution variable on growth is positive only in regression (3.4), but is 
insignificant across all four regressions. However, the most important thing is that the story 
on resource curse continues to hold with panel regression results. Basically, it says that 
countries with high institutional quality seem to obtain higher growth rates from their resource 
endowment than those with poor institutions. For instance, the growth impact of a marginal 
increase in resource implied by regression (3.1) is: 
 
It can be shown that the institutional threshold for not having the resource curse 
increases to 0.6 from 0.5 in the previously obtained OLS cross-country regressions. This 
result stays qualitatively the same even with the exclusion of regional dummies (Latin and 
Africa). Result of regression (3.3) in which African economies are excluded confirms that the 
results are not driven by African countries or the resource curse is not mainly an ‘African 
phenomenon’.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Comparing to the OLS cross sectional results in the previous section, the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are higher for the panel case. The increase in the point estimate of the 
institution quality threshold from 0.5 to 0.6 reduces the number of countries that can avoid 16 
 
 
being resource cursed by almost half, from 31 to 16, a sample that consists of mostly 
developed countries. 
As a robustness test, we have also investigated each individual component of the 
ICRG indicator separately to check if the previous analysis is still robust to different measures 
of institutions.
5 These components include the rule of law, corruption in government, and 
bureaucratic quality. The results for each of the components are qualitatively the same as 
those of the ICRG indicator in that better institutional quality can mitigate the negative effect 
of resource abundance on growth, but only countries of the best institutions can fully abate 
resource curse.
6 
4- Institutional performance versus institutional design 
The ICRG indicator and its components used thus far are measures of institutional 
performance, which concerns itself with institutional accomplishment, such as endured levels 
of corruption. One criticism of the use of institutional performance measures is that they are 
likely to be endogenous in growth in the sense that the more economic growth enables a 
country to invest more in institutional infrastructure, hence an improvement in the quality of 
institutions (Hall and Jones, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2003). To address this problem, we 
follow Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) to use measures of institutional design as alternative 
measure of institution quality. Institutional design such as the electoral rule (e.g. simple 
majority versus proportional regime) or the form of government (e.g. parliamentary versus 
presidential system) rarely changes and therefore relatively less prone to endogeneity 
problems compared to institutional performance measures. 
This paper employs a number of institutional measures that fall into the group of 
institutional design. Data are collected from the World Bank’s Database on Political 
Institutions except for the ‘democracy’ index, which is obtained from the Fraser Institute. 17 
 
 
Details on the construction of those variables, data used, and results obtained are presented 
below. 
Democracy versus non-democracy  
The presence of democratic institutions offers a review process of government power that 
curbs the potential of public officers to accrue personal wealth and prevents them from 
coming up with unfavourable policies (Barro 1996). Therefore a more democratic country is 
considered of better institutions than a less democratic one. In this paper, countries are 
classified as either democratic or non-democratic, based on Alesina and Perotti’s (1994) 
definition of democracy. A country is considered a democracy if its citizens are granted with 
sufficient civil and economic liberties. Data for this classification are the Fraser Institute 
indices of political rights and civil liberties, or the GASTIL indices as commonly known. To 
give an idea, each of the two indices runs from 1 to 7; a score of 1 to 2 means ‘free’, 3 to 5 
‘semi-free’ and 6 to 7 ‘not free’. Following Persson (2002) and Andersen and Aslaksen 
(2008), a simple average of the two indices is calculated and if the average turns out to be less 
than or equal to 3.5, then the country is classified as democratic, otherwise it is not. On this 
basis, a dummy variable, DEM, is created such that it takes the value 1 for a democratic 
regime and 0 for a non-democratic regime. The coefficient on DEM is expected to be positive.  
Table 4 presents all the results comparing democracies with non-democracies. The 
results suggest that democracies outperform non-democracies in terms of economic growth. 
Ceteris paribus, for a democratic country, a one standard deviation increase in resource 
abundance is estimated to increase growth by 932.84*[-0.002 + (0.004*1)] = 1.87 %. 
Conversely, the same one standard deviation change in resource abundance results in a 
decline in growth of the same magnitude for a non-democratic country.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 18 
 
 
Electoral rules  
Democratic countries can differ vastly in their voting systems. Therefore, we further stratify 
the democratic countries according to their electoral rules: proportional rule or majority rule. 
Under proportional rule, seats are given in proportion to the vote share, whereas under the 
majority rule, seats are allocated according to politicians with the highest vote. As majority 
rule politicians are more accountable to the larger population that voted for them in the first 
place, it is expected that the rents extracted by politicians in this regime will be less than the 
proportional regime (Persson, 2002; Persson et al., 2003; Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman, 
2005). 
To capture the above mentioned features of institutions, this paper constructed two 
dummy variables named MAJ and Non-DEM respectively. The dummy MAJ is equal to 1 for 
a democratic majority system and 0 otherwise. The Non-DEM is set to 1 for a non-democratic 
country and 0 otherwise. In this way, economies with a democratic proportional rule represent 
the control group.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Results in Table 5 show that democratic majorities have a statistically significant 
positive effect on economic growth relative to their proportional counterparts. However, this 
system benefits less from its resource abundance as compared to its proportional counterpart 
and the non-democratic system (as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficient on 
interaction term between MAJ and natural resource variable across different regressions). 
There are several plausible explanations. First, as much as extending more political rights and 
civil liberties, a democratic majority system  may bring about conflicts over issues of 
distribution (Alesina and Perotti, 1994). Although modest personal accruement of resource 
wealth is expected under a democratic majority, the need to adopt policies that satisfy the 19 
 
 
majority of the population/electorate may lead to projects that are inefficient, hence hindering 
economic growth (e.g. Cuddington, 1989; Sachs and Warner, 2001). The government in 
power could find it difficult to adjust welfare commitments fearing that such a decision may 
be unpopular with the electorate. Hence, politicians may allocate resources in a way that can 
enhance their chances of being re-elected without any regard to allocation efficiency 
(Robinson et al., 2006; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). Second, a Botswana-type democratic 
majority with very weak opposition may lead to less-than-anticipated checks and balances as 
well as competitiveness of the regime. This is probably because the ruling party in Botswana 
has never lost an election since independence in 1966 so politicians may become too 
comfortable due to the lack of competition from other parties.
 7  
Forms of the government 
One aspect of legislation is the maintenance of power. Whether or not the executive needs 
continuous support from the majority of the assembly to stay in power will matter for its 
accountability and for the implementation of its policies. A regime can either be presidential 
or parliamentary. In the former, the president can hold onto power without gaining support 
from the assembly whereas in the latter, the government’s existence depends on the 
continuous backing of the majority of congress. Under the parliamentary regime, politicians 
need continuous confidence of the assembly so they are less likely to abuse their power and 
hence they will extract relatively less rent ( Persson, 2002; Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman, 
2005). Based on this argument, Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) hypothesise that parliamentary 
democracies will be less resource cursed than their presidential counterparts. 
Taking into account the idea about how the form of government may affect the natural 
resource – growth nexus, this study divides the group of democratic countries into democratic 
presidential and democratic parliamentary sub-groups. As a result, there will be three 20 
 
 
categories of countries: countries under democratic presidential regime, countries under 
democratic parliamentary regime, and non-democratic countries. Accordingly, two dummy 
variables are generated: the dummy PRES is equal to 1 if a country is under the presidential 
regime and 0 otherwise; Non-DEM is equal to 1 if a country is non-democratic and 0 
otherwise. Countries with a democratic parliamentary regime represent the control group. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
The results in Table 6 suggest that, relative to parliamentary democracies, non-
democracies tend to have lower growth rates while presidential democracies tend to have 
higher growth rates. The inclusion of interaction terms in regression (6.3) and (6.4) change the 
sign of the resource indicator from negative to positive, implying that there is a significant 
positive effect of resource abundance on growth in a parliamentary regime. Generally, a 
presidential democracy with abundant resources performs worse than its parliamentary 
counterpart, while non-democratic nations are not statistically different from parliamentary 
regimes. 
Such results are not unusual in the growth literature. For instance, Kunicova´ and 
Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that presidential democracies are typically more corrupt than 
their parliamentary counterparts. However, Persson and Tabellini (2000) argue that a US form 
of presidential regime is expected to be less corrupt because of checks and balances in place 
as well as its competitiveness. Even then, they could not empirically validate such an 
assertion for all countries in their sample, except for well-established democracies. Kunicova´ 
and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that checks and balances are not a typical characteristic of 
such presidential regimes and they are sceptical that Persson and Tabellini’s results may be 
misleading due to potential endogeneity and inability to solve it in cross sectional data. In 
such cases, it is possible that corrupt governments choose presidentialism so that they are able 
to extract more rent or countries may be more corrupt because they choose presidentialism. 21 
 
 
Our panel estimation, which has taken into account of endogeneity, yielded results that 
support the argument of Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman (2005). 
5- Conclusion 
This paper examines whether the theory of resource curse is supported in the data. It also 
investigates whether institutional quality, and what type of institutional setting, matters most 
in terms of abating the resource curse. Overall, no matter what form of institutional design or 
which individual components of institutional performance are considered, or what 
econometric technique used (cross-sectional OLS, 2SLS or panel system GMM), the results 
suggest that the resource curse exists, but that the quality of institutions can help abate this 
resource curse. In other words, the finding is very robust across different estimation 
techniques that natural resource abundance can be a boon rather than a curse, provided that a 
country has sufficiently good institutions (and policy settings).  
The research presented here provides a useful lesson for governments and policy 
makers on how they might take advantage of their abundant natural resources and pursue 
higher economic growth rates against the inherent impediments that can potentially come with 
resource abundance i.e. the resource curse. Specifically, the following policy 
recommendations are worth considering:  
(a) Pay attention to the quality of institutional setting, such as corruption levels, law 
and order, and bureaucracy. Good institutional setting could diminish rent seeking activities, 




(b) Be democratic. A democratic country is one that grants its nation adequate civil 
and economic liberties. This is important because the more liberty is granted to citizens, the 
more market and entrepreneurial activities, hence economic growth, will occur.  
(c) Adopt a majoritarian rather than proportional electoral system. Any system that 
requires backing by the majority of the population ensures less rent seeking tendencies. This 
is mainly because in such regimes, the politicians are concerned about their re-election, hence 
future political career. Therefore, a democratic majority regime is certainly better than a 
proportional equivalent.  
(d) Adopt a parliamentary, rather than a presidential regime. A parliamentary regime, 
one where the government needs continuous support of the majority of assembly, is better 
than a presidential regime, where a president can still be in power without parliamentary 
backing. A parliamentary regime reduces rent seeking as well as personal accrual of resources 
due to checks and balances. Furthermore, the regime encourages the government to be 
transparent and accountable, failing which they lose power.  
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Table 1 – Natural resources, institutions, and growth: OLS regressions (cross section) 
 
Variable (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)
a (1.4)  (1.5) 















































(0.008)    










Latin  -0.74 
(0.86)      -0.43 
(0.69) 
Africa  -1.03 
(0.70)      -0.90 
(0.63) 
R
2  0.52 0.49 0.52  0.48 0.50 
Countries  53 53 33  53 53 
Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. All regressions include an unreported constant. (a) African 




Table 2 – Natural resources, institutions, and growth: 2SLS regressions (cross section) 
 
Variable (2.1)  (2.2)  (2.3) 








































Africa   -0.74 
(0.62) 
 
N 53  53  53 
R
2  0.47 0.50  0.47 
Exogeneity test 
a 
(p - value) 
0.77 0.68  0.78 














2  0.78 0.78  0.78 














2  0.99 0.99  0.99 
Notes: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
(a)
 The null hypothesis is that institutions are exogenous. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita. Institutional quality and 
interaction term are instrumented. External instruments: latitude and resource multiplied by latitude. Investment, openness 
and initial income are internal instruments. INTERINSTRUMENT = latitude interacted with natural resource abundance. 
Institutions are the dependent variables for the upper part of the first stage regressions while the interaction of resources and 




Table 3 - Natural resources, institutions, and growth: panel two-step system GMM 
regressions 
 
Variable  (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 





































(0.04)   








Latin  -4.86 
(6.43)     
Africa  -3.04 
(2.39)     
Countries  53 53 33 53 
Notes: All regressions include time dummies and constants (not shown). Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 4 - Natural resources, institutions, and growth: democracies vs. non-democracies 
(panel GMM regressions)  
 
Variable (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4) 


































Openness  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01)    








Latin  -3.60 
(3.95)    
-3.05 
(0.51)*** 
Africa  -1.45 
(1.15)    
-2.00 
(0.50)*** 
Countries  53  53 53  53 
Notes: A dummy variable, DEM = 1 for democracy and 0 otherwise is the measure of institutional design. All regressions 
include time dummies and constants (not shown). Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. The figures in 









Table 5 - Natural resources, institutions, and growth: electoral rules (panel GMM regressions) 
 
Variable  (5.1) (5.2) (5.3)  (5.4) (5.5)  (5.6) 





























































(0.001)    
























Latin  -1.33 
(0.70)*   
-0.08 
(0.66)   
-0.64 
(0.61)   






Countries  49 49 49  49 49  49 
Notes: The following countries are excluded due to lack of data: Oman, Saudi Arabia, USA, and China. All regressions 
include time dummies and constants (not shown). Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. The figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 6 - Natural resources, institutions, and growth: forms of the government (panel GMM 
regressions) 
 
Variable (6.1)  (6.2)  (6.3) (6.4) 




























































Latin  -2.11 
(0.67)***   
-1.81 
(0.66)*   




Countries  52  52 52  52 v 
 
Notes: China is excluded from the analysis since there is no data indicating whether it is a presidential or parliamentary 
regime. All regressions include time dummies and constants (not shown). Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
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Non-renewable resource rents per 
capita. Sum of mineral, forestry and 
energy resources, excluding forestry 
rents. 




Investment   (%  GDP)  Gross capital formation (formerly 
gross domestic investment) consists 
of outlays on additions to the fixed 
assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories. 
Fixed assets include land 
improvements (fences, ditches, 
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, 
and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and 
the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. Inventories are 
stocks of goods held by firms to 
meet temporary or unexpected 
fluctuations in production or sales, 
and "work in progress." According to 
the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of 
valuables are also considered capital 
formation. Data are  measured as 
percentage of GDP. 






Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services 







  Unweighted average of quality of 
bureaucracy, corruption and law and 
order. It ranges from 0 (bad 
institutions) to 1 (good institutions). 
 
Generated based on Knack’s 
(2000) definition. Data from 
Political Risk Services 
Latitude    Latitudinal distance from the 
equator, in absolute degrees terms 







Latin = 1 for Latin American 
countries 
         = 0 otherwise 







Africa = 1 for African countries 
           = 0 otherwise 
Coding based on World Bank’s 
country classifications 
 
GDP per capita  Income level  Gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population (constant 2000 
US$). 
WDI database vi 
 
 
RULE  Rule of law  Measure of law and order. It ranges 
from 1 (weak law and order) to 6 
(strong law and order). The law 
component measures the potency and 
fairness of the legal system. Whilst 
the order component is intended to 
measure the general adherence to the 
law (Data available for the period 
1984-2005). 
 
Political Risk Services 
BUREAUCRACY  Bureaucratic 
quality 
The maximum point is 4, which is 
given to countries where the 
bureaucracy has the power and 
capability to govern without 
radically adjusting policy or 
interrupting government services. 
(Data available for 1984-2005). 
 
Political Risk Services 
CORRUPT  Corruption in 
government 
Measures the level of corruption 
within the political system. The form 
of corruption measured here covers 
bribes, nepotism, bribing of public 
servants etc. (Data available for the 
period 1984-2005). 
 
Political Risk Services 
MAJ  Majority 
regime 
A dummy variable for majority 
regime. 
MAJ = 1 plurality or majority regime 
         = 0 proportional regime 
 
Generated based on data from 
Beck et al. (2001) 
 
     
PRES  Presidential 
regime 
A dummy variable for presidential 
regime. 
PRES = 1 presidential regime 
           = 0 parliamentary regime 
Generated based on data from 
Beck et al. (2001) 
 
DEM  Democratic 
regime 
A dummy variable for democratic 
regime. 
DEM =1 democratic regime 












Real GDP  per capita 
growth 
Finland 1.00 5.33  2.15 
Sweden 1.00 40.03  1.70 
Denmark 1.00  83.56  1.90 
Netherlands 0.99  164.68  2.25 
Iceland 0.99  37.74  1.65 
Canada 0.99  681.23  2.05 
New Zealand  0.98  126.06  1.40 
Norway 0.96 1147.03  2.60 
Australia 0.93  480.49  2.25 
USA 0.91  329.93  2.15 
Bahrain 0.65 3184.14  1.73 
Malaysia 0.65  264.92  3.58 
Botswana 0.65  39.55  5.44 
Chile 0.64  231.71  -0.18 
South Africa  0.64  119.31  -0.18 
Oman 0.60  2488.93  2.11 
Brazil 0.58  62.17  1.03 
China 0.57  29.53  8.75 
Saudi Arabia  0.57  2957.60  -0.95 
Morocco 0.57  8.98  1.83 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.56  1071.98  1.20 
Jordan 0.56  11.90  -0.01 
India 0.54  11.37  3.73 
Ecuador 0.54 197.74  0.60 
Papua New Guinea  0.53  182.93  0.64 
Tunisia 0.53  81.05  2.48 
Madagascar 0.53  0.01  -1.03 
Iran 0.52  395.75  0.87 
United Arab Emirates  0.52  5157.65  -2.16 
Venezuela 0.51  838.77  -1.01 
Dominican Republic  0.51  14.73  2.09 
Mexico 0.49 244.63  0.91 
Zimbabwe 0.47  16.92  -1.17 
Guinea 0.47  23.58  0.99 
Egypt 0.47  57.93  2.21 
Cameroon 0.46  74.04  -0.95 
Senegal 0.44 0.93  0.14 
Jamaica 0.44 52.17  1.49 
Ghana 0.44  3.35  1.99 
Algeria 0.43  355.83  0.07 
Gabon 0.42  747.21  -1.04 
Niger 0.41  0.19  -1.41 
Zambia 0.40 25.63  -1.09 
Suriname 0.40  160.40  0.18 
Peru 0.40  63.80  0.60 
Guyana 0.36 51.66  1.95 
Sierra Leone  0.35  63.53  3.55 
Indonesia 0.34  63.53  3.55 
Togo 0.32  2.35  -0.39 
Bolivia 0.32  50.03  0.49 
Nigeria 0.32  116.99  0.91 
Sudan 0.27  7.43  1.99 viii 
 
Congo Rep.  0.12  210.46  -1.72 
 
Table A3 - Cross Country Summary Statistics Data (NOT for publication) 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Initial income level  53  5898.30  8396.43  45.23  34845.57 
Growth 53  1.20  1.95  -2.16  8.75 
Investment 53  20.22  5.31  7.06  32.63 
Openness 53  69.53  35.71  18.74  186.04 
Resource abundance  53  429.79  952.25  0.01  5157.65 
Institutional 
quality 53  0.57  0.22  0.12  1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WDI data. 
 
 
Table A1 - Panel Summary Statistics Data (NOT for publication) 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Initial income level  954  5898.30  8321.20  45.23  34845.57 
Growth 954  1.19  3.26  -12.06  13.37 
Investment  954  20.20  6.21 4.38 45.05 
Openness  954  69.74 37.90 12.85 256.30 
Resource abundance  954  413.02  932.84  0.00  6410.08 
Institutional 
quality  954  0.57 0.23 0.09 1.00 
BUREAUCRACY  954  2.29 1.12 0.00 4.00 
RULE    954  3.63 1.54 0.56 6.00 
CORRUPT  954  3.27 1.45 0.00 6.06 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WDI data. 
 
 